

Message Text

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2757

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3812

E.O. QQYTW: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: OPTION III: FRG PAPER ON COMMON CEILING

1. AT JULY 17 SPC MEETING, FRG REP (HOYNCK) SAID HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIOS RE FRG VIEWS ON DEFINITION OF THE COMMON CEILING IN CONNECTION WITH OPTION III. HE STATED THAT HE HOPED TO CIRCULATE A PAPER BASED ON HIS INSTRUCTIONS. HE HAS NOW GIVEN THE MISSION THE FULL TEXT OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH IS TRANSMITTED AT THE END OF THIS MESSAGE. HE INDICATED FRG WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS AT JULY 18 TRILATERAL. HE SAID THAT WHAT FRG CIRCULATES IN SPC WILL PROBABLY BE A MODIFIED, SHORTENED VERSION OF THIS PAPER.

2. THIS PAPER SEES TWO MAIN ALTERNATIVES RE DEFINITION OF THE COMMON CEILING. ONE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE A NUMERICAL DEFINITION IN PHASE I. HOWEVER, THE PAPER STATES THAT AMERICAN OBJECTIONS TO TIS COURSE CANNOT BE DISREGARDED. THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO REQUIRE AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON
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CEILING CONCEPT, WHILE SPECIFYING THE "ASYMMETRICAL ORIGINAL SITUATION". FRG PAPER ALSO CALLS FOR AGREEMENT ON THE COLLECTIVE NATURE OF THE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS, EXCEPT FOR SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS.

3. BEGIN FRG TEXT

SUBJECT: MBFR, OPTION III;

DEFINITION OF THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING (CCC)

1. THERE IS AGREEMENT WITHIN NATO AS TO THE CENTRAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING (CCC) AS PART OF THE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT OF THE ALLIANCE. WE THINK THAT ALL STEPS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL HAVE TO BE EXAMINED AS TO WHETHER AND HOW THEY CAN SERVE THE REALIZATION OF THIS OBJECTIVE. THIS DOES NOT DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE OF REDUCING SOVIET TANKS. HOWEVER, IT WILL BE OBVIOUS THAT THIS REDUCTION OBJECTIVE OF THE FIRST PHASE IS SECONDARY TO THE OBJECTIVE OF THE WHOLE MBFR PROGRAMME.

2. WE CAN AGREE THAT, AS FAR AS THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AD-HOC GROUP ON OPTION III ARE CONCERNED, THE CCC SHOULD BE QUALIFIED BY THE WORDS "APPROPRIATELY DEFINED". HOWEVER, SUCH A GENERALLY-WORDED DEFINITION OF THE OBJECTIVE REQUIRES THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD AGREE IN DETAIL ON WHAT "APPROPRIATELY DEFINED" MEANS. WITHOUT THIS CLARIFICATION WITHIN NATO, THIS WORDING WOULD BE AMBIGUOUS AND RISKY IN AN INSTRUCTION TO THE AD-HOC GROUP. AGREEMENT TO THE WORDS "APPROPRIATELY DEFINED" DOES NOT EXCLUDE THAT WE SHOULD ILLUSTRATE THE NUMERICAL SCOPE OF CCC.

3. IT RESULTS FROM THE ABOVE THAT A FINAL FORMULATION OF THE RELEVANT PART OF THE INSTRUCTION TO THE AD-HOC GROUP WILL ONLY BE POSSIBLE ONCE COMMON NATO UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE TERM "APPROPRIATELY DEFINED".

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4. IN THE EYES OF NATO, OPTION III IS THE DECISIVE AND ONLY CONCESSION WHICH IS DESIGNED TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE OF CCC IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MEANS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO SET THE COURSE TOWARDS THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CCC AS CONCRETELY AS POSSIBLE BY PLACING OPTION III ON THE TABLE DURING THE FIRST PHASE.

5. THERE IS AGREEMENT WITHIN NATO THAT THERE WILL BE NO ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR OFFER AND NO NEW INPUTS OF WHATEVER KIND IN THE SECOND PHASE. THIS MEANS THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE DATA WORKED OUT BY US, IT WILL BE NECESSARY IN THE SECOND PHASE TO DEMAND CONSIDERABLE

ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS FROM THE OTHER SIDE IN ORDER
TO ACCOMPLISH CCC. THEORETICALLY SPEAKING, TWO
APPROACHES OFFER THEMSELVES. EITHER,

-) OPTION III IS TIED SUBSTANTIVELY AND IN TERMS OF
TIME TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CCC, I.E. THE END
OF THE SECOND PHASE, OR

B) IT IS COUPLED WITH THE CONTENT OF THE FIRST PHASE
WITH THE PROVISIO THAT THIS ALREADY CONSTITUTES AN
ESSENTIAL DEGREE OF PREPARATION OF THE SECOND
PHASE WHICH IS THUS MADE MORE COMPELLING.

6. THE TERM" CCC APPROPRIATELY DEFINED" DEMANDS A
STATEMENT ON

A) THE SUBSTANCE OF CCC, AND

B) ITS MODALITIES.

7 ON THE SUBSTANCE:

A) ANY STATEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF CCC OBVIOUSLY
DEMANDS THAT ITS STRUCTURE HAS BEEN DEFINITELY
AGREED AND THAT THERE IS A COMMON ALLIANCE POSITION
ON IT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE QUESTION WHETHER
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CCC RELATES TO GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL OR TO THE
COMBINED GROUND-AIR PERSONNEL CAN BE LEFT OPEN.

B) OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE IS AN INTERNAL ALLIANCE AGREEMENT
ON THE NUMERICAL SCOPE OF CCC, INDEPENDENTLY OF
WHETHER A NUMERICAL DEFINITION IS BEING ATTEMPTED
ALREADY IN CONNECTION WITH OPTION III OR NOT.

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C. THE MOST UNEQUIVOCAL SUBSTANTIVE DEFINITION OF CCC WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE ONE IN TERMS OF FIGURES. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT PUTTING FORWARD OPTION III WOULD AMOUNT TO A DEMAND FOR A NUMERICAL DEFINITION OF CCC. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THIS APPROACH WHICH HAVE SO FAR BEEN PUT FORWARD WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ARE SOUND. NEVERTHELESS, IT MUST BE ASKED WHETHER THEY ARE EXHAUSTIVE. THE AMERICAN OBJECTION THAT THIS WOULD ANTICIPATE THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE AND WOULD OFFER THE WP AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE MODALITIES TO BE AGREED IN THE SECOND PHASE CANNOT BE DISREGARDED. NOR SHOULD IT BE OVERLOOKED THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THE NUMERICAL SCOPE OF CCC WOULD BE A STRONG ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF AGREEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE MODALITIES.

D) THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE NUMERICAL DEFINITION CONSISTS IN THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF WHAT THE ALLIANCE HAS
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ALWAYS HAD IN MIND IN DEMANDING AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON-CEILING CONCEPT. MERE AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON-CEILING CONCEPT WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT BE ENOUGH TO EXERT A RELIABLE INFLUENCE ON THE REDUCTION PROBLEMS OF THE SECOND PHASE. AS WE SEE IT, THERE IS AGREEMENT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THIS POINT. THE MINIMUM DEMAND WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE MADE IS AGREEMENT TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CCC IN THE SECOND PHASE. HOWEVER, THIS DEMAND IS ONLY USEFUL FOR THE REDUCTION PROBLEMS OF THE SECOND PHASE I.E. THE NEED FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS, IF AGREEMENT TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CCC IS LINKED UP WITH AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE BASIS FOR THE DATA AFTER THE FIRST REDUCTION STEP. IN OUR VIEW, RENUNCIATION OF THE NUMERICAL DEFINITION REQUIRES THAT THE ASYMMETRICAL ORIGINAL SITUATION SHOULD BE SPECIFIED, THUS PROVING THE NEED FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH CCC.

8. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THESE TWO POSSIBILITIES, OR IT WILL HAVE TO TRY TO COMBINE THEM . WE DO NOT THINK THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO FORECAST WHICH OF THE TWO ALTERNATIVES WOULD STAND THE BETTER CHANCE OF BEING ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER SIDE.

9. MODALITIES OF CCC:

WE CONSIDER THAT ALREADY THE TERM "COMMON CEILING CONCEPT" WOULD HAVE REQUIRED PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE MODALITIES, I.E. CONCERNING

- THE COLLECTIVE CHARACTER OF THE CEILINGS EXCEPT THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN SUB-CEILINGS,
- THE LIMITATION TO MANPOWER LEVELS,
- THE COLLECTIVE NATURE OF THE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS, AGAIN WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS.

10. CONCEIVABLE FILLING-OUT OF THE TERM "APPROPRIATELY DEFINED" BY NATO:

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A) WHAT IS NON-CONTROVERSIAL IS A NUMERICAL FIRING WITHIN NATO OF THE LEVEL OF CCC OR, IN OTHER WORDS, CLEAR AGREEMENT ON WHAT WOULD BE THE LOWEST LEVEL FOR NATO DOWN TO WHICH UNDIMINISHED SECURITY COULD BE ENSURED.

B) IT COULD BE EXAMINED WITHIN NATO WHETHER BOTH OF THE TWO VARIANTS MENTIONED ABOVE FOR THE DEFINITION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF CCC ARE TO THE SAME EXTENT IN THE INTEREST OF NATO. IF THIS IS FOUND TO BE THE CASE, IT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED TO INCLUDE THESE TWO VARIANTS AS TACTICAL NEGOTIATION ALTERNATIVES INTO THE SUBSTANTIVE POSITION FOR VIENNA. IN EITHER OF THESE TWO CASES, THEY WOULD THEN NOT BE FALL-BACK POSITIONS BUT CONSTITUTE A POSSIBILITY TO ARGUE FLEXIBLY ACCORDING TO THE SITUATION OF THE CONFERENCE TABLE. WE THINK THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, BE FAVOURED BY THE FOLLOWING FACTS.:

- THE POSSIBLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF THE DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS WHICH HAS BEGUN IN VIENNA CANNOT YET BE FORESEEN;

- THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OR THE OTHER VARIANT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DEFINITION-WHICH MAY BE EQUIVALENT IN OUR EYES-IS MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WARSAW PACT THAN THE OTHER:

C) WE CONSIDER THAT GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE MODALITIES FOR

THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CCC SHOULD BE LINKED UP
WITH BOTH SUBSTANTIVE DEFINITIONS.

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